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Abstract 
CHINA’S NEW MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS: 
A framework and research agenda 
 
by Matthew D. Stephen 
China has recently taken the lead in fostering several new multilateral initiatives which 
mirror the policy tasks of existing institutions. This article provides a framework for 
studying such ‘parallel institutions’ and sketches an emerging research agenda. First, it 
provides an empirical overview of China’s new institutions. Second, it defines parallel 
institutions and provides analytical categories for describing types of parallel institutions 
and integrating them into existing IR theory. This centers on a typology of relationships 
between parallel institutions and incumbent institutions, which can be reinforcing, com-
plementary, substitutive, or competing. Third, it examines explanations for parallel insti-
tution building. Fourth, it considers the implications of parallel institutions in the context 
of an international power shift.  
Keywords: China, parallel institutions, global governance, regime complexity 
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Zusammenfassung 
Chinas neue multilaterale Institutionen: 
Ein Theoriemodell und Forschungsprogramm 
 
von Matthew D. Stephen 
In den letzten Jahren hat China die Führungsrolle im Aufbau mehrerer multilateraler Ini-
tiativen übernommen, die existierende Institutionen und deren Aufgaben spiegeln. Dieser 
Beitrag liefert den theoretischen Rahmen zur Untersuchung solcher Parallelinstitutionen 
und entwirft ein entsprechendes Forschungsprogramm. Erstens wird ein empirischer 
Überblick über Chinas neue Institutionen gegeben. Zweitens werden Parallelinstitutionen 
definiert und analytische Kategorien bereitgestellt, die eine Beschreibung unterschiedli-
cher Typen von Parallelinstitutionen und deren Integration in bestehende IB-Theorien 
ermöglichen. Im Zentrum steht hierbei eine Typologie von Beziehungen zwischen paralle-
len und bestehenden Institutionen, die verstärkend, komplementär, substitutiv oder kon-
kurrierend sein können. Drittens werden Erklärungsansätze zur Herausbildung von Paral-
lelinstitutionen untersucht. Viertens wird die Bedeutung paralleler Institutionen vor dem 
Hintergrund internationaler Machtverschiebungen beleuchtet.  
Stichworte: China, Parallelinstitutionen, Global Governance, Regimekomplexität 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the Chinese government has engaged in a host of institutional crea-
tion efforts. Flagship examples include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB), and negotiations for a Regional Com-
prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Less prominent initiatives include the Boao 
Forum for Asia, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in 
Asia (CICA), and the Macroeconomic Research Office of the ASEAN Plus Three1 group of 
countries (AMRO). For Oliver Stuenkel, “rising powers—led by China—are quietly 
crafting the initial building blocks of a so-called ‘parallel order’ that will initially 
complement, and one day possibly challenge, today’s international institutions” 
(Stuenkel 2016a:10). 
In light of China’s growing weight in world politics, Chinese-led multilateral-
ism has been met with some apprehension. The United States’ Obama administration 
strongly opposed the creation of the AIIB, lobbied its allies to shun the institution, and 
complained of “constant accommodation” of China (Dyer and Parker 2015). Likewise, 
long before Donald Trump complained about China’s trade policies, Obama complained 
that “China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region. Why would 
we let that happen? We should write those rules” (Schlesinger, Obe, and Magnier 2015). 
Others survey China’s institution-building efforts as a “shadow foreign policy” out to 
challenge the established international order (Heilmann et al. 2014; Subacchi 2015). 
At the same time, the determinants and effects of international institutional pro-
liferation have become a core issue of study in International Relations. Multilateralism 
and international institutions have proliferated vigorously since 1945, leading to an 
increasingly institutionalized environment. In this context, fruitful scholarship has 
emerged on topics such as “regime complexity” (Alter and Meunier 2009a; Drezner 
2009; Raustiala and Victor 2004), “institutional proliferation” (Mansfield 1998; Pratt 
2017; Raustiala 2013), “fragmentation” (Biermann et al. 2009; International Law 
Commission 2006), “overlapping institutions” (Busch 2007; Urpelainen and Van de 
                                                 
1 ASEAN Plus Three refers to the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as well as 
China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
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Graaf 2014), “institutional balancing” (He 2014; Yuan 2018),  and “contested multilat-
eralism” (Morse and Keohane 2014). This research agenda has focused on the reasons 
that states strategically opt for pursuing new multilateral initiatives where one al-
ready exists in a given issue area, and what the consequences are for rule-guided co-
operation more broadly. 
The purpose of this article is to bring together these policy-oriented and theory-
driven research strands to sketch an emerging research agenda on China’s new insti-
tutions. Its primary goal is conceptual. It seeks to develop a concept adequate to iden-
tify and describe an important empirical phenomenon that currently escapes sus-
tained focus from scholars. Its secondary objective is empirical. It seeks to identify the 
cases of Chinese parallel institution-building between 1990 and 2016 and to use these 
examples to formulate generalizable statements that deserve further empirical study. 
Several insights emerge which have important implications for both empirical studies 
of Chinese multilateralism, and the theoretical literature on institutional prolifera-
tion. Four stand out. 
First, existing theoretical literature has tended to focus on the creation of new 
formal intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). This has tended to overshadow many 
less formalized multilateral mechanisms by which actors can and do influence exist-
ing regimes. The creation of new IGOs should be seen as one end of a continuum of 
multilateral options by which China and other states may influence existing institu-
tions. Examples include the creation of new informal intergovernmental organizations 
and clubs (Vabulas and Snidal 2013) and the hosting of new international conferences, 
forums, and summits. Excluding these alternative forms of multilateralism because 
they do not reach the level of institutionalization realized by formal IGOs represents a 
truncation on the dependent variable. Theoretical literature needs to expand its focus 
from traditional, formal IGOs to take in the full range of parallel institutions. 
Second, any attempt to provide generalizable statements about the type, motiva-
tions, and effects of China’s new institutions must cope with strong inter-institutional 
variation. While some of China’s parallel institutions appear largely reinforcing of the 
institutional status quo, in other areas there are significant points of divergence. 
Moreover, the dynamism of parallel institutions suggests the relationships can change 
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over time. This suggests that China’s dissatisfaction with the status quo varies accord-
ing to institutional context, and that parallel institution building is a highly differen-
tiated phenomenon. 
Third, parallel institutions should not be seen purely as exit options to incumbent 
institutions. Rather, the Chinese government continues to pursue its interests in es-
tablished institutions even while building parallel ones. Parallel institutions strength-
en China’s hand by legitimating its preferences and improving its bargaining power in 
established institutions (Chen and Liu 2017). This challenges the view that institution-
al creation is a ‘last resort’ strategy that is pursued only when the use of existing ones 
and forum shopping are exhausted as options (Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013:28). 
Fourth, the Chinese pursuit of parallel institutions appears to be motivated to a large 
extent not purely (or even mostly) by efficiency gains but by the legitimacy-
enhancing effects that multilateralism can convey. This, at least, is an important issue 
for future research. 
This article proceeds as follows. First, it provides an empirical overview of China’s 
multilateral institutional initiatives between 1990 and 2016. Second, it surveys exist-
ing theoretical literature on institutional proliferation and identifies the shortcom-
ings of established concepts to adequately capture the phenomenon of China’s new 
multilateral initiatives. I develop the concept of ‘parallel institutions’ to describe this 
phenomenon. Second, building on this concept, the article develops a framework for 
studying parallel institutions and integrating them into existing IR theory. This cen-
ters on a typology of relationships between parallel institutions and incumbent ones. 
These can be reinforcing, complementary, substitutive, or competing. These types are 
derived from two dimensions, one relating to institutions’ substantive policies and 
social purposes, and the other relating to their political authority. Different types of 
parallel institution-building are associated with different types of dissatisfaction with 
the institutional status quo, and with different implications for the institutional order.  
The article then turns to possible explanations for parallel institution-building by 
China. Power considerations, efficiency, and status concerns are each plausible expla-
nations, but particular emphasis is placed on the legitimating effects of multilateral-
ism as a core incentive for parallel institution building. Finally, the article draws on 
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theoretical literature on regime complexity and institutional overlap to consider the 
implications of parallel institutions in the context of an international power shift, 
both for existing institutions, and for the policy areas they regulate. 
2. China’s New Multilateral Institutions 
Over the last decade, China has taken the lead in fostering a series of new internation-
al institutions. Some of these institutions are formal intergovernmental organiza-
tions, based on an international treaty. Others are informal forums, initiated by China, 
but which depend on the participation of foreign state and non-state actors. As such, 
some of these institutions stretch traditional understandings of regionalism (Acharya 
2014; Garzón 2017) and multilateralism (Keohane 1990; Ruggie 1992). Some institu-
tions are regional, while others are open to global participation. What they have in 
common is that they typically replicate functions of existing multilateral institutions. 
These institutions are not limited to a particular issue area but cover a range of policy 
fields, most notably development finance, trade and investment, crisis lending and 
multilateral economic surveillance, and security collaboration. 
As a recently risen global power, and a potential regional hegemon in Asia, China 
faces an already institutionalized status quo. For this reason, any multilateralism it 
initiates is likely to come up against established institutions that share the same poli-
cy field or have overlaps in membership. As such, the few studies that have sought to 
analyze these institutions collectively have labeled them “parallel” institutions (Heil-
mann et al. 2014; Paradise 2016; Stuenkel 2016b). As China has grown more confident 
in its institutional innovations, these institutions have proliferated and are attracting 
increasing attention (see also Ikenberry and Lim 2017; Keithley 2014; Stephen and 
Skidmore 2019; Wang 2015; Yuan 2018), and prompted interest in whether a parallel, 
China-centric institutional order is emerging (Barma et al. 2009). 
To gain an overview of China’s parallel multilateral initiatives, we surveyed multilat-
eral institutions created in the period 1990 to 2016 in which China has had a leading 
role or been a founding member.2 We gathered data from the Yearbook of International 
                                                 
2 I gratefully acknowledge research assistance provided by Johannes Scherzinger. 
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Organizations of the Union of International Associations3 and supplemented this with 
additional material from a survey by the Mercator Institute for China Studies4 and the 
results of a news article search using Lexis Nexis Academic. The coding procedure is 
described in the appendix. Our efforts resulted in the overview provided by Table 1. 
While we cannot be sure the table includes all of China’s multilateral initiatives in this 
time, it at least provides a lower floor of the phenomenon.  
 
                                                 
3 (Eds.). (n.d.). Yearbook of International Organizations 2016-2017, Volume 6. Leiden, Niederlande: 
BRILL. Retrieved Mar 16, 2018, from https://brill.com/view/title/33166 
4 Heilmann, S., Rudolf, M., Huotari, M., & Buckow, J. (2014). China’s shadow foreign policy: parallel 
structures challenge the established international order. China Monitor, 18, 28. 
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China’s institutional initiatives can be grouped into nine categories based on their 
policy field and multilateral format: security, general-purpose regional and inter-
regional forums, finance, credit ratings, internet governance, space technology, trade 
and investment treaties, multilateral development banks, and the Belt Road Initiative. 
A fuller descriptive overview and literature review of these institutions is provided in 
the appendix, but some generalized empirical observations can be offered. 
At the outset, this descriptive overview casts doubt on the claim that “Asia’s 
growing economic weight in the world economy is unlikely to produce substantial 
changes in global economic governance” (Kahler 2010:178). It is also at odds with 
claims that the Communist Party of China has a general aversion to institution build-
ing and a distaste for ‘global governance’ (Butt 2016), as well as the conclusion that 
any emerging “world without the West” will be characterized by a shift “away from 
institutions and toward transactions” (Barma et al. 2009:541). Rather, the picture that 
emerges from this overview is that while China has actively courted existing institu-
tions and increasingly sought their reform, it has also been increasingly active in the 
creation of numerous new institutional initiatives in Asia and beyond.  
The earliest institutions in which China played the role of co-sponsor were the 
regional security institutions of CICA (1999) and the SCO (2001). In the early 2000s, 
China was also active in setting up the Bo’ao Forum and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue. 
In this phase, China was focused on allaying its neighbors’ concerns about its increas-
ing power and building linkages to other developing countries via inter-regional fo-
rums (with Africa in 2000, the Middle East in 2004, and later Latin America in 2015).  
Despite China’s accession to the WTO being wrapped up by 2003, China’s interest 
in building new institutions has only increased. By the 2010s China began to build 
new formal intergovernmental organizations, and to do so on a potentially global lev-
el. Alongside building new financial infrastructure (the Universal Credit Rating Group 
and the CIPS payment system) and asserting itself more strongly in the internet gov-
ernance field (the World Internet Conference in 2014), by 2016, the NDB and AIIB were 
already in business, the BRICS CRA, CMIM, and APT AMRO were launched, and negotia-
tions were underway on the RCEP and FTAAP. China’s interest in initiating new insti-
tutions appears mostly to post-date its accession to the existing institutional order. 
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There is significant variation in the format or “design” (Koremenos, Lipson, and 
Snidal 2001) of China’s new institutions. This includes variation in membership scope, 
level of formality, and publicness. Some institutions are intended to be global in char-
acter and are open to all members of the United Nations (e.g. AIIB, NDB), others are 
limited to China’s region (e.g. SCO, CICA, CMIM), while others do not rely on state mem-
bership but are really Chinese initiatives that are nonetheless based on a high level of 
international buy-in (e.g. the World Internet Conference, the Bo’ao Forum). China’s new 
institutions range also in level of formality, from the formal constitution of new in-
ternational organizations (IOs) via legal treaties (e.g. SCO, CICA, CMIM, NDB, AIIB) 
through to informal intergovernmental forums (e.g. BRICS) and nationally-organized 
international summits (e.g. the Bo’ao Forum, the Belt Road Forum). Moreover, China’s 
new institutions vary in terms of their publicness, from fully public intergovernmen-
tal organizations (e.g. APSCO, AIIB, SCO) through to largely private ventures supported 
by governmental agencies (e.g. CIPS, the Universal Credit Rating Group). It is also im-
portant to note that China’s role in setting up these institutions also varies. In some 
cases, such as the AIIB or BRI, China initiated the institutions and played the key role 
in organizing their founding. In others, such as the CMIM or RCEP, China has joined a 
pre-existing institution, and by virtue of its size and influence, in doing so it has given 
the institution a new meaning. 
Finally, while China’s new institutions cover a wide range of issues areas, some 
are notably absent. Despite some acceptance of international human rights treaties 
over the last decades (Dingding 2009), China has not taken notable new initiatives in 
the field of human rights. While China was party to the Bangkok Declaration of 1993, 
which became associated with “Asian values” (Bauer 1996), Asian initiatives in human 
rights have been largely limited to ASEAN’s human rights mechanism (Renshaw 2013). 
China has not (yet) sought to use new institutions to promulgate a Chinese approach to 
human rights. 
3. Parallel Institutions 
China has engaged in a burst of multilateral initiatives and institution building. But 
how should we think about these initiatives? While most observers see China’s new 
institutions as an important development in Chinese foreign policy with significant 
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implications for international order, there is not yet agreement on how to understand 
them theoretically. Can they be grouped together as an identifiable phenomenon, or 
are they simply a mixture of new multilateral institutions and traditional regional-
ism? Are they examples of “competitive regime creation” (Morse and Keohane 2014) 
designed to challenge incumbent institutions or rather complementary additions to 
the institutional landscape?  
At the moment, uncertainties over the categorization and meaning of these insti-
tutions extend to the issue of how to describe these institutions. Analysts who have 
examined the institutions as a group have referred to them as simply as “new institu-
tions” (Keithley 2014; Wang 2015; Xiao 2016), but they are also sometimes described as 
“alternative” institutions or structures (Heilmann et al. 2014; Ikenberry and Lim 
2017), examples of “rival regionalisms” (Frost 2014), “intersecting regionalism” 
(Acharya 2015), or more sinisterly, “shadow” institutions (Rudolf 2016:89). The empiri-
cal observation that China has initiated or assisted in the creation of a series of new 
international summits and institutions needs to be conceptualized in theoretical 
terms if it is to contribute to a broader understanding of international politics. To 
what universe of cases do they belong? Do they constitute a coherent phenomenon at 
all, worthy of sustained theoretical attention?  
China’s new institutions can be understood in several theoretically meaningful 
ways, each of which imparts its own nuances and research agendas, but each of which 
comes with certain analytical trade-offs. But there appear to be few ‘off the shelf’ con-
cepts than can capture the full range of China’s multilateral initiatives. 
Guided in particular by the criteria of parsimony, familiarity, resonance, and the-
oretical utility (Gerring 1999), I will follow others in referring to them as parallel in-
stitutions (Heilmann et al. 2014; Paradise 2016; Stuenkel 2016b), and to the act of their 
creation as parallel institution building. While China’s parallel institutions have attract-
ed increasing attention, they are yet to be explicitly and clearly defined (e.g. Paradise 
2016:150). Yet little progress can be made in the absence of a clear definition of terms. 
I define parallel institutions as institutions whose tasks replicate or compete with 
those of an already existing (incumbent) institution. This definition rests on two key 
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components: (1) institutionalization and (2) replication or rivalry in relation to an ex-
isting institution.  
First, as our primary focus is on organizations, platforms, and forums that vary in 
terms of formality, publicness, and geographical extent, institutions are defined here 
as explicit arrangements, involving the participation of international or transnational 
actors, that are designed to govern and otherwise influence behavior. In this understand-
ing, institutions are not equivalent to recurring patterns of behavior (Young 
1982:277), although they may produce patterns of behavior. Institutions may consist 
of deliberately designed rules to “prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior” 
(Koremenos et al. 2001:762), but their tasks can also remain more diffuse than regula-
tive norm building, such as promoting information exchange or opportunities for in-
formal socialization. They can also be distinguished from informal norms or shared 
beliefs (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Institutions, in this understanding, include 
treaties, organizations, forums, regularized summits, and agreements. Institutions are 
more specific than broader “regimes” (Keohane 1995) but the concept is also more 
encompassing than “organizations”.  
Second, parallel institutions need to replicate or offer an alternative to the tasks 
and goals of existing ones. ‘Institutional tasks’ is a deliberately broad category that 
includes such things as international policy coordination, standards-setting, norm 
generation, information exchange, socialization opportunities, and research and advo-
cacy activities. Task replication or competition exists if two criteria are met: if a par-
allel institution is designed to or actually does provide the same policy tasks as an 
existing institution, and if the target members or participants of the parallel institu-
tion intersect with those of an established one (compare Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 
2014:801).  
Because the classification of parallel institutions is not a trivial task, it is helpful 
to contrast them to alternative categories in order to clarify what parallel institutions 
are not. Johannes Urpelainen and Thys van de Graaf, for example, study the creation of 
“overlapping institutions”, i.e. institutions that either have intersecting target mem-
berships or seek to regulate the same common pool resource (Urpelainen and Van de 
Graaf 2014:801). Parallel institutions can qualify as overlapping institutions in this 
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sense but do not necessarily. For example, the BRICS forum qualifies as a parallel in-
stitution to the G7 because it replicates the institutional tasks of informal policy coor-
dination among major powers, yet their memberships do not overlap. Similarly, some 
platforms like the World Internet Conference are not based on formal membership at 
all but are clearly designed to compete for influence in shaping the policy fields of 
existing institutions.  
Similarly, Julia Morse and Robert Keohane have recently offered the concept of 
competitive regime creation. This is defined as the creation of “an alternative multi-
lateral institution to compete with existing ones” which “always involve[s] conflict 
between the rule, institutionalized practices, or missions of two different institutions” 
(Morse and Keohane 2014:387). The new institution ought to “conflict with or signifi-
cantly modify the rules and institutionalized practices of the status quo institution” 
(Morse and Keohane 2014:388). Yet, by definition, parallel institutions need not com-
pete with existing ones; they may also be reinforcing or complementary. Parallel in-
stitutions may indeed complement or even deepen the rules of an existing institution, 
as much as challenge it (de Búrca 2016). At the same time, in common with much of 
the rationalist literature, the concept of competitive regime creation appears to be 
limited to the establishment of formal multilateral institutions (Keohane 1990:731; 
Morse and Keohane 2014:385), whereas parallel institutions may but may not reach 
this level of formalization. More informal platforms such as transnational summitry 
(for example, the Bo’ao Forum), or publicly-supported private authorities (such as the 
Universal Credit Group) can also qualify as parallel institutions. 
Parallel institution building is also not equivalent to institutional replacement, 
that is, “the renegotiation of an institution intended effectively to replace an existing 
one” (Cottrell 2009:220). Regardless of the intentions behind parallel institution build-
ing, as will be argued below, it is only substitutive parallel institutions that can realis-
tically replace an existing institution. While some parallel institutions may be substi-
tutive (the RCEP is designed to multilateralize and effectively replace a series of 
ASEAN-related preferential trade agreements), not all parallel institutions have this 
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relationship to incumbent institutions.i Likewise, parallel institution building is a 
much more specific multilateral strategy than Kai He’s notion of institutional balanc-
ing, defined as “countering pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dom-
inating multilateral institutions” (He 2008: 489). Moreover, in contrast to the concept 
of institutional balancing, the notion of parallel institutions does not assume that the 
creation of new institutions is part of a realist strategy for “security under anarchy” 
(He 2008: 489). 
Finally, parallel institutions can be regional, but need not be. Regional institu-
tions, i.e. international institutions whose membership is limited to an imagined re-
gion, are an increasingly common feature of world politics (Acharya 2014; Katzenstein 
2005), and some of China’s key parallel institutions, such as the AIIB, have been dis-
cussed in the context of a new regionalism (Kahler 2016). But while the populations of 
parallel institutions and regional institutions may overlap, they do not converge. 
While the AIIB has a regional focus, its membership is global. The NDB or BRICS are not 
regional institutions, but inter-regional initiatives. 
In general, a common feature of pre-existing concepts is that they draw a sharp 
distinction between multilateral institutions and bilateralism or unilateralism. While 
this is perfectly legitimate, it risks becoming an artificial limitation in the context of 
parallel institution building. It is not obvious why our focus should be limited only to 
formal multilateral organizations, when some parallel institutions may take the form 
of national initiatives that depend on international participation. Moreover, a focus 
exclusively on public institutions may neglect the role of private authority. For exam-
ple, credit rating agencies exercise a form of private authority over market partici-
pants and sovereign borrowers (Lake 2010:604–7; Sinclair 2005) and have become a 
cite of parallel institution building in the form of the Universal Credit Group. Identify-
ing parallel institutions relies on some degree of analytical nous and qualitative 
judgment. 
                                                 
i The same principle differentiates parallel institution building from Joseph Jupille and others’ un-
derstanding of “institutional creation” as “the replacement of one set of governance rules by a novel 
institutional order” (Jupille et al. 2013:10). 
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4. Four Types of Parallel Institutions 
Existing literature on China’s parallel institutions tends to assume that they exist in a 
competitive relationship to established, ‘Western’ institutions (Heilmann et al. 2014; 
Stuenkel 2016a). Indeed, concepts such as competitive regime creation (Morse and 
Keohane 2014) may contribute to this assumption. Yet, there is good reason to think 
that the reality is more complex.  
There are several kinds of relationships that parallel institutions can take on in 
relation to existing institutions. To capture these relationships, this section develops a 
typology that is based on two key dimensions.ii The categories for these relationships 
are inspired by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky’s (2004) seminal study of the 
role of informal institutions in comparative politics and draws on insights generated 
in International Relations on institutional proliferation and inter-institutional politi-
cal strategies.  
Political decision-making power 
The first dimension of the typology relates to the degree to which parallel institutions 
challenge or redistribute the decision-making power and political authority of existing 
institutions within a regime complex.iii Quite simply, as new institutions are created, 
established institutions may lose out (Morse and Keohane 2014:385). Does a given par-
allel institution challenge and erode, or complement and reinforce, the role and au-
thority of established institutions?  
Political decision-making power in international institutions is distributed across 
two levels. On one level, there is a distribution of political power between decision-
making institutions and organizations. For example, while both the United Nations 
Security Council and the African Union participate in the regime complex for interna-
tional security, in this relatively integrated regime, it is the Council that exercises a 
greater level of political authority, defined as the capacity to make recognized binding 
                                                 
ii It is important to note that these dimensions do not refer to the (potentially inscrutable) motives 
that actors have in parallel institution building, but refer to institutional relationships that can be 
empirically verified. Contrast with (e.g.) (Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2016). 
iii A regime complex is “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions govern-
ing a particular issue-area” (Raustiala and Victor 2004:279). See also (Alter and Meunier 2009a:13; 
Keohane and Victor 2011:8–9). 
 18 
 
decisions (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012:70). On a subterranean level, howev-
er, there is also a balance of decision-making power between the actors that control 
these institutions. To stay with the example of the Security Council, while the Council 
takes decisions for the whole UN membership, it is the five permanent members who 
exercise oversized influence over the Council’s authority.  
The addition of parallel institutions can alter the distribution of political influ-
ence across both these levels. Most obviously, a new (parallel) institution may take on 
new decision-making functions that challenge the authority of existing institutions. 
Competition for competences, status, and resources may ensue (Gehring and Faude 
2014). This competition may induce differential institutional growth (Streeck and The-
len 2005:23), which, in its extreme, can lead to the outcompeting of one institution by 
the other. The out-competing of one institution by another, either by completely 
poaching its policy functions, or monopolizing the relevant organizational resources, 
could lead in extreme cases to institutional displacement. 
But parallel institution building can also have an impact at the second, subterranean 
level, by altering the political opportunities for actors to exercise influence over insti-
tutions. Clearly, parallel institutions are likely to give a different set of countries 
greater decision-making power. They may also open up new opportunities for forum 
shopping and regime shifting (relocating an international policy process or activity 
from one international venue to another in order to alter the status quo) (Alter and 
Meunier 2009a:17; Helfer 2004:14). Alternatively, parallel institutions may reinforce 
the authority of existing institutions, such as by making their decisions subordinate 
to, or conditional on, those of existing institutions.  
Importantly, these changes in authority do not (necessarily) affect the social purpose 
of governance. Provided that principles, rules, and norms of parallel institutions are 
convergent with those of established institutions, any changes in the balance of deci-
sion-making power will be changes ‘within’ the existing system (Krasner 1982:187).  
Social Purpose 
The second dimension concerns the degree to which parallel institutions diverge from 
the substantive goals, policies, practices, and norms of established institutions. The key 
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here is whether parallel institutions actually produce outcomes that are significantly 
different from those of established institutions, aside from the distributive questions 
of which actors gain the most and which actors exercise the most influence. While 
international institutions often try to present themselves as apolitical bureaucracies, 
the policies they promote always serve some political, economic, or cultural values; in 
other words, they perform a broader social purpose (Barnett and Finnemore 1999:708; 
Cox 2001:53; Keohane 2012:125; Ruggie 1982:380). The degree to which parallel insti-
tutions promote alternative principles, rules, and norms determines, from a rational-
ist perspective, whether they are in fact part of the same regime or offer an alterna-
tive (Krasner 1982:188). Expressed differently, the social purpose of institutions refers 
to the “principles about fact, causation, and rectitude, as well as political rights and 
obligations that are regarded as legitimate” that institutions embody (Ruggie 
1982:380). Do parallel institutions embody alternative norms and operate according to 
different principles, or not? If global ‘hegemony’ depends not only on the distribution 
of political power, but on an economic and social structure (Cox 1983:171–72), the so-
cial purposes of parallel institutions can inform judgments about whether contempo-
rary powers signal a change of hegemony, or a change within hegemony (Ruggie 1982). 
The clearest historical example to illustrate the concept of parallel institutions 
that embody different social purposes may be the bifurcated international economic 
and social order that has been referred to as the Cold War. On one side of the Iron Cur-
tain, the United States and its allies cultivated an institutional order that promoted a 
vision of ‘embedded liberalism’ characterized by a form of state-regulated capitalism 
(Cox 1987:214; Ruggie 1982:393–404). This centered on international institutions such 
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)iv and Marshall Plan aid, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Monetary Fund. On 
the other side of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union promoted international institu-
tions based on the ideas of ‘really existing socialism’ (Hobsbawm 1995:372–400; Ma-
zower 2012:244–49). Key international institutions in this order were the Com-
munist Information Bureau (Cominform, 1946-1957), the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon), the International Bank for Economic Co-operation, and the In-
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ternational Investment Bank (IIB) (Brabant 1998:51–52; Butler 1978). These parallel 
institutions, which emerged contemporaneously as parts of rival modernities, clearly 
differed strongly in their goals, policies, practices, and norms. 
At a more prosaic level, modern parallel institutions may promote social purposes 
that differ only somewhat from existing ones. For example, Raustiala and Victor, in 
their study of plant genetic resources, suggest that states can sometimes deliberately 
create new rules that are inconsistent, or even incompatible, with those of existing 
institutions, in order to win political wiggle room, a situation they term ‘strategic in-
consistency’ (Raustiala and Victor 2004:301–2). Further examples will be discussed 
below.  
The addition of this “social purpose” dimension of inter-institutional relation-
ships results in the four types of parallel institutions depicted in Figure 1. This typolo-
gy offers greater precision and analytical clarity regarding the nature of China’s new 
institutions and opens up new pathways for further research. 
 
Figure 1: Types of Parallel Institutions 
Political Authority 
Social Purpose 
Cooperative Rivalrous 
Convergent Reinforcing Substitutive 
Divergent Complementary Competing 
Source: Inspired by Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 728) 
Reinforcing Institutions 
Where cooperative authority relationships with established institutions align with 
convergent social purposes, we can speak of reinforcing parallel institutions. Reinforc-
ing parallel institutions enhance or strengthen the authority relationships of existing 
institutions and do so in a way that promotes their policies, practices, missions, and 
norms. Reinforcing parallel institutions would be a sensible choice for actors who are 
                                                                                                                                               
iv Originally the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
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in principle satisfied with existing institutions, and do not wish to challenge them, but 
believe that they are underperforming and can benefit from the addition of a new 
institution. Because reinforcing parallel institutions do not challenge either the au-
thority relationships or the substantive goals of existing institutions, one can hypoth-
esize that they are likely to be initiated by actors who would remain committed to 
existing institutions in principle, but for are persuaded that they can realize the same 
goals via an alternative institution.  
The GATT/WTO regime’s foreseen relationship to regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
is a good example of how reinforcing parallel institutions are supposed to work. When 
the participants of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment founded 
the GATT in 1947, they had to decide how the GATT would relate to existing and poten-
tial new RTAs. Regional trade agreements—also known as preferential trade agree-
ments—represent a departure from the norm of non-discrimination that was sup-
posed to be at the core of the GATT regime. Recognizing the political reality that some 
countries would only join the GATT if RTAs would be allowed, Article XXIV was added 
permitting RTAs under certain conditions. These conditions included, among others, 
that the RTAs do not increase trade barriers to excluded countries, that they cover 
“substantially all trade”, and that they are officially notified with GATT members. In 
this way, the authors of the GATT sought to make sure that any future RTAs would de-
part neither from the authority of the GATT nor its substantive goals. 
Another modern example of a reinforcing parallel institution is the creation of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for the interception of vessels at sea suspected of 
transporting illegal weapons. Here, the United States wanted to improve the imple-
mentation practices under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS), rather than alter its principles or challenge the authority of the UNCLOS (de 
Búrca 2016:323; Morse and Keohane 2014:401). More generally, Gráinne de Búrca has 
argued that several recent cases of parallel institution-building did not in fact involve 
much conflict over either authority or substantive rules, but rather involved new in-
stitutions for the purpose of “advancing the goals and practices of the first institution, 
or supplementing and enhancing them, rather than necessarily challenging or un-
dermining them” (de Búrca 2016:322). In the case of reinforcing parallel institutions, 
new institutions enhance and support the norms and authority relationships of exist-
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ing institutions. If China’s new institutions are of the reinforcing type, China’s rise 
could spell a deepening and consolidation of the existing institutional order. 
Complementary Institutions 
Complementary parallel institutions also establish cooperative authority relationships 
with established institutions but do so in a way that promotes a social purpose diver-
gent from that of existing institutions. Complementary parallel institutions are likely 
to be set up by actors that seek alternative substantive outcomes from existing insti-
tutions but wish to do so in a way that does not challenge the authority of existing 
institutions. The notion of complementarity emphasizes that this type of parallel in-
stitutions may cover new cases, fill in gaps, or promote alternative models, compared 
to established institutions. A solid division of labor based on different organizational 
tasks, combined with formal coordination or cooperative relations between institu-
tions, would be strong indicators of complementary parallel institutions. 
In some ways, Chinese representatives have sought to portray their new institu-
tions as examples of complementary institution building. Take the AIIB. In terms of 
authority, the AIIB quickly entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and its lending has typically been in collab-
oration with existing banks. The first president of the AIIB has also spoken about the 
bank in reassuring terms as not being opposed to anyone, and the AIIB as wanting to 
partner, rather than compete, with the United States and its institutions (Stephen and 
Skidmore 2019:74–82). At the same time, in terms of content, the bank’s president has 
spoken of needing to take the needs of developing countries more fully into account, 
and as the name suggests, the focus of AIIB lending will be in infrastructure geared 
towards sustainable development, rather than any overarching mission to reduce 
poverty (which it sees as a downstream effect of economic development). If this turns 
out to be the case, and the AIIB evolves a cooperative relationship based on a division 
of labor with established multilateral development banks, this would be a strong ex-
ample of complementary parallel institution building in which a new institution “in-
troduces positive feedback effects that enhance cooperation and the effectiveness of 
any one cooperative regime” (Alter and Meunier 2009b:14). 
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Substitutive Institutions 
The right side of Figure 1 corresponds to types of parallel institutions that take on a 
rivalrous authority relationship to existing institutions. These types of parallel insti-
tutions challenge and detract from the authority relationships sustained by existing 
institutions, for example by competing for membership, for resources, and seeking to 
erode or supplant the role of established institutions. Substitutive parallel institutions 
do this in a way that is nonetheless still convergent with the social purpose embedded 
in existing institutions.v The notion of substitutive institutions corresponds to what 
John Ikenberry and Darren Lim describe as a strategy of “external innovation”: creat-
ing a new institution that “would not purport to operate under or promote substan-
tively different rules and practices, but rather—to use an economic analogy—be a 
new entrant within the competitive institutional marketplace” (Ikenberry and Lim 
2017:8).  
The creation of substitutive parallel institutions would be a potentially attractive 
option for actors who are primarily dissatisfied with the current distribution of influ-
ence and authority embodied in existing institutions, rather than dissatisfaction with 
substantive policies, practices, and norms. Nonetheless, substitutive institutions may 
come tied up with “unhelpful competition across actors, inefficiencies, and transaction 
costs that end up compromising the objectives of international cooperation and inter-
national governance” (Alter and Meunier 2009b:14). The building of substitutive paral-
lel institutions results in a more complex inter-institutional environment, in which 
different institutions rival each other for resources and to provide governance tasks, 
but these rivalries will play out at the level of political influence and authority, rather 
than contestation of the basic rules and principles. The primary goal is to realize a 
“redistribution of authority in a regime complex” (Morse and Keohane 2014:408). 
The inter-institutional rivalry that emerged between the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in the security 
sphere may be one case of substitutive parallel institution-building. UNASUR was cre-
ated by seven South American nations in 2008 as a parallel institution to the much 
                                                 
v Substitutive institutions are so called because they can act as substitutes for existing institutions. 
This does not imply that they are necessarily designed to replace them. 
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older OAS (founded 1948). According to Brigitte Weiffen and others, UNASUR sought to 
take on a role as a regional security organization as a viable South American substi-
tute to the US-dominated OAS but did so ironically by modeling itself on the goals and 
functions of the OAS, which is seen as a credible regional organization (Weiffen, 
Wehner, and Nolte 2013). While they see some cases of norm adaptation and modifica-
tion, the major relationship of UNASUR to OAS is as a strategic substitute driven by 
authority issues (Weiffen et al. 2013:384). 
A similar story has been told about some of China’s new institutions. John 
Ikenberry and Darren Lim ultimately interpret China’s new institutional statecraft as 
being compatible with the norms and rules of existing institutions, but as being deep-
ly significant in its erosion of American dominance over the liberal international or-
der (Ikenberry and Lim 2017). Heilmann and others also emphasize the redistribution 
of political authority in their account of China’s new institutions, seeing them as “in 
part complementary, in part competitive” in relation to existing institutions. They are 
designed primarily to “increased China’s autonomy vis-à-vis U.S.-dominated institu-
tions and to expand its international sphere of influence” (Heilmann et al. 2014:1). 
Oliver Stuenkel also sees the BRICS’ parallel institutions primarily as “a tool to en-
hance their capacity to gain privileges of leadership and slowly reduce the United 
States’ institutional centrality”, rather than representing any departure from existing 
principles and norms (Stuenkel 2016b:1). The general picture of these accounts is one 
in which China’s new institutions are of the substitutive type. 
Competing Institutions 
The final theorized type is that of competing parallel institutions. Competing institu-
tions are consistent with a counter-hegemonic or ‘revisionist’ strategy (Cooley, Nexon, 
and Ward 2019; Drezner 2019). Competing institutions challenge both the authority 
and the purposes of existing institutions. A rivalrous, potentially zero-sum relation-
ship develops between the parallel institution and its incumbent, and the parallel in-
stitutions pursue goals that are substantively at-odds, or even antithetical, to those of 
the incumbent institution. This produces strong inter-institutional competition and 
starkly divergent social models. The creation of competing parallel institutions would 
be a rational approach for actors that are dissatisfied with their place in the distribu-
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tion of political authority in a given regime complex and seek to address this per-
ceived shortcoming at the same time as promoting an alternative policy framework or 
set of norms.  
In addition to the Cold War system discussed above, one familiar example of com-
peting parallel institution building may be the case of competing regionalisms in the 
Latin American context. For some scholars, the proliferation of autochthonous parallel 
institutions from South America such as UNASUR and especially the Bolivarian Alli-
ance for the Americas (ALBA) was founded not just in a counter-hegemonic challenge 
to external (US) influence, but on “new foundational ideas and institutions” (Riggirozzi 
and Tussie 2012:3). The ALBA was seen by several observers as a blueprint for an al-
ternative social purpose to established institutions, representing some kind of post-
capitalist, post-liberal form of regional integration (Chodor and McCarthy-Jones 2013; 
Escobar 2010). By challenging both the social purpose and the political authority of 
established institutions, these “counter-hegemonic” institutions conform to the com-
peting type elaborated here. Another example would be the attempt of developing 
countries to contest the norms and authority of the GATT and Bretton Woods institu-
tions by setting up the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), and seeking to relocate important policy functions to this new institution 
(Taylor and Smith 2007). UNCTAD would become a key institutional antagonist in de-
veloping countries’ campaign for a New International Economic Order, which sought 
to revise the basic principles and norms of the international economy (Cox 1979; 
Krasner 1985). The creation, in 1994, of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under the auspices of the WTO to contest the au-
thority and rules of the pre-existing World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
may be another more recent example of competing parallel institution building 
(Morse and Keohane 2014:407). 
5. Accounting for Parallel Institution Building 
China’s apparent interest in paralleling institution-building leads directly to the ques-
tion of why and how such institutions emerge. To date, the literature that takes insti-
tutional proliferation as its point of departure has not done so in the context of Chi-
na’s rise or the institutional conflicts that may exist between rising and established 
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powers. The tendency has been to depict parallel institutions as a result of bargaining 
failure. 
In their study of the creation of overlapping institutions, Johannes Urpelainen 
and Thys van de Graaf argue that the creation of new institutions with similar man-
dates and overlapping memberships results from a bargaining failure whereby a dis-
satisfied challenger fails to reform the focal institution sufficiently and is consequent-
ly incentivized to create an alternative. They explain this outcome as a result of (1) 
institutional capture by actors opposed to the challenger, and (2) strong domestic po-
litical pressure on the challenger to change the status quo. If neither condition is met, 
or if only one is present, no new institution building occurs. “It is the combination of 
the two conditions that is sufficient to explain de novo creation” (Urpelainen and Van 
de Graaf 2014:824). At the same time, they acknowledge that there may well be alter-
native paths to parallel institution-building that will be increasingly important to 
examine in the context of rising powers such as China and India. 
A similar approach is developed by Julia Morse and Robert Keohane. They demur 
from developing a formal explanatory theory of “competitive regime creation”, but 
suggest that preconditions for it include dissatisfaction with the status quo, and an 
inability to change the “blocked institution” (2014: 390). A further necessary condition 
for competitive regime creation is the ability to pursue outside options. But why don’t 
already existing institutions reform? The authors suggest that reform can fail for two 
reasons: (1) if the challengers are unable to credibly threaten their outside option, or 
(2) if the focal institution is subject to veto players who are able and willing to prevent 
reform (Morse and Keohane 2014:391). 
A similar—rationalist but more power-sensitive—approach to institutional crea-
tion has been developed in a prominent co-authored study. Joseph Jupille and others 
consider a more demanding form of substitutive parallel institution building in which 
the new institution is intended to replace the established institution (Jupille et al. 
2013:10). They assume a boundedly rational actor who makes sequential “institutional 
choices” to further their interests. Where actors can resolve their “cooperation prob-
lems” within existing institutions, their imperfect knowledge and aversion to risk will 
lead them to “use” existing institutions. Actors may seek alternative existing institu-
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tions (“selection”) or seek to reform existing ones (“change”), but only if there is no, or 
no satisfactory, focal institution. Ultimately, if existing institutions are so deficient, 
they may pursue creation (Jupille et al. 2013:35–36). They consider creation to be the 
costliest and most risky form of institutional choice and consequently consider it a 
rare phenomenon in world politics.  
These existing studies offer important insights and generate compelling hypothe-
ses that can be further assessed in the cases of Chinese parallel institution building. At 
the same time, they do not speak with one voice, and this in itself can provide fodder 
for further empirical and theoretical study. For example, Jupille and others emphasize 
that new institution building occurs more often in the absence of a clear focal institu-
tion, and requires the dissatisfied party to have a reasonable expectation of success. 
Yet Urpelainen and van de Graaf find these factors to be irrelevant and emphasize the 
roles of institutional capture and domestic political pressure on challenging states.  
Zheng Chen and Yanchuan Liu similarly develop rationalist bargaining theory, but 
ultimately offer an alternative account of parallel institution building (Chen and Liu 
2017). For Chen and Liu, problems of credibly committing to using exit options are 
only partly relevant to explaining parallel institution building. Rather, the problem 
lies more in the commitment problems created in the context of the uncertainty and 
realpolitik inherent in rapid shifts in power (Chen and Liu 2017:6). They draw on 
Hirschman’s classic study (Hirschman 1970) to categorize parallel institution building 
as a form of ‘exit’ or outside option in relation to established institutions. In seeking 
reform of existing institutions (voice), a rising power will have greater bargaining 
leverage if its exit options are good (Lipscy 2015). Even if a rising state is able to cred-
ibly threaten exit, an established power may still not be willing to concede sufficient 
reforms because it cannot be sure this will satisfy the rising power in the long term. 
Moreover, the established power may prefer to hold on to its institutional privileges 
in order to retard its relative decline (Chen and Liu 2017:6). The rising power may, 
therefore, initiate parallel institutions for three reasons (Chen and Liu 2017:7-10): (1) 
to improve its outside options in order to secure more favorable reform; (2) to im-
prove its outside options in case reforms fail; and (3) to reassure both established and 
smaller powers that its intentions are not malign. The implication is clear: parallel 
institution building will occur when the benefits of self-restraint through delegation 
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to an IO outweigh the costs to policy autonomy and ability to threaten other states 
(Chen and Liu 2017:10). 
The literature on China’s new institutions has not yet developed many general 
theoretical accounts of why China has engaged in parallel institution building, or what 
can explain important variation such as why it has occurred in some areas but not in 
others, or why it has emerged at some times and not others. There are however some 
common themes that can be identified in the emerging literature on China’s new in-
stitutions.  
First, in a vindication of the theoretical studies cited earlier, there is largely a 
consensus on the linkage between parallel institution-building and established insti-
tutions being ‘captured’ by status quo coalitions. The creation of the AIIB is often 
linked, for example, to the failure of the Bretton Woods institutions to sufficiently 
accommodate China’s aspirations (see, e.g., Chen and Liu 2017; Chin 2016; Chow 2016; 
Xiao 2016). Nonetheless, there are important exceptions. The creation of the BRICS 
group, for example, took place despite vigorous attempts by established powers to 
integrate the BRICS into existing apex informal forums, via the boost in the status of 
the G20 of major industrialized and emerging economies and courting of the ‘outreach 
five’ by the G7 (Cooper 2016:24–35; Parízek and Stephen 2019; Peters 2019; Stuenkel 
2013). While stalled reform in the established institution is a key condition associated 
with parallel institution building, it is not a necessary condition.  
Second, several existing studies of China’s new institutions argue that the major 
factor behind their creation lies in dissatisfaction over the distribution of political 
authority, rather than dissatisfaction with norms and policy content. For Oliver 
Stuenkel, China’s pursuit of parallel institution building is strictly about distributions 
of power and political authority, rather than substantive policy or normative change 
(Stuenkel 2016b:1). New institutions are inherently about providing the BRICS states 
with greater leverage and enabling them to break rules when it is necessary, in a like 
manner to the United States. In exchange, they will increase their provisions of global 
public goods (Stuenkel 2016b:11) This is a transactional logic based on a social con-
tract: the BRICS provide other countries with public goods and international institu-
tions, in exchange for acquiescence when they deem it necessary to break the rules. 
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China’s institutions are designed to “enhance its privileges” (Stuenkel 2016b:14). Simi-
larly, for Zheng Wang, China’s new institutions are about becoming “a leader with sub-
stantial influence”, a path that was not available to it within the framework of exist-
ing institutions (Wang 2015:19).  
A slightly different picture emerges from studies by James Paradise and John 
Ikenberry and Darren Lim. In Paradise’s survey of China’s parallel institutions, he ar-
gues that the Chinese government’s primary goal is to enhance its participation in 
global governance, given the only partial success it has had at reforming existing in-
stitutions (Paradise 2016). But in addition, Paradise also suggests that China’s parallel 
institutions “are infused, to some degree, with Chinese norms, values, standards and 
sensibilities” (Paradise 2016:163). Matthew Stephen and David Skidmore come to a 
similar conclusion based on their analysis of the AIIB and its relation to the liberal 
international order (2019). Likewise, in their examination of China’s possible reasons 
for creating the AIIB, John Ikenberry and Darren Lim consider the role of factors such 
as wealth, political influence, status and prestige, and promoting national values or 
ideology (Ikenberry and Lim 2017). They see the AIIB as probably being driven by a 
range of motivations, including both pecuniary motives and enhancing Chinese influ-
ence and authority at the expense of the United States and existing institutions 
(Ikenberry and Lim 2017:11–13). Nonetheless, it is early days for the AIIB, and such 
interpretations are not universally shared (Flanagin 2015; Zhou 2015). But these stud-
ies do suggest that while China’s parallel institution building may not represent a rad-
ically different social purpose of global governance, they have the potential to revise 
some of the norms and policy frameworks that remain embedded in established insti-
tutions. 
Much more research is needed on the conditions and motivations behind parallel 
institution building, and many of China’s institutions are yet quite new. Existing liter-
ature indicates that facilitative conditions for parallel institution-building include (1) 
an inability to realize ambitions in established institutions due to entrenched status 
quo coalitions (Morse and Keohane 2014; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2014); (2) the 
resources available to engage in the costly and risky task of institutional creation (Ju-
pille et al. 2013); (3) the existence of strongly dissatisfied domestic actors within states 
that challenge to change the status quo (Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2014); (4) nor-
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mative divergence from established powers and institutions (Paradise 2016; Stephen 
and Skidmore 2019). 
As yet, the work of classifying China’s institutions according to their inter-
institutional relationships, and explaining their emergence, is still in its infancy. In 
the future, research on China’s parallel institutions could benefit from greater atten-
tion to theoretically-derived explanations and the assessment of the relative role of 
different explanatory factors. Four appear to be particularly promising. 
First, the creation of substitutive or competing institutions suggests that power 
considerations play a central role. From a realist perspective, China is engaged in a 
power transition with the United States, in which established international institu-
tions continue to represent the interests of the United States (Tammen et al. 2000; 
Tammen and Kugler 2006). China can be expected to use the full spectrum of its for-
eign policy to hasten its rise, militarily and economically. To the extent that estab-
lished international institutions become roadblocks to altering the international dis-
tribution of power, they will become the object of Chinese revisionism. This might 
take the form of utilizing existing institutions to constrain US power, or ‘soft balanc-
ing’ (Paul 2005). Alternatively, such power plays may take the form of using creating 
new institutions (He 2008, 2014). This implies that (relative) power concerns are the 
driving forces behind China’s parallel institution building. Evidence for a power-based 
explanation would be found in cases of China prioritizing geopolitical and military 
goals over alternatives, such as commercial or reputational interests. Power concerns 
would also suggest China will focus on building parallel institutions of the rivalrous 
kind. 
Second, the role of functional gains-seeking should be taken seriously, even in 
the face of apparent efficiency costs of institutional proliferation. According to the 
assumptions of rational institutionalism, due to the costs of institutional set-up, and 
the uncertainty of their success, states should be inclined to utilize existing institu-
tions to solve their cooperation problems. Urpelainen and Van der Graaf claim that 
parallel institution building is, therefore, puzzling from a rational institutionalist per-
spective (2014:799). But functional gains-seeking may be a powerful explanation of 
parallel institution-building if the established institutions in a given policy field are 
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under-performing. If parallel institutions are designed with purposes similar to exist-
ing ones but seek to improve on their performance or operate with greater efficiency, 
this would be a strong indicator that functional gains seeking is at play. This implies 
that China’s parallel institutions will be either of a substitutive or reinforcing type.  
Third, a strong case can be made for the roles of status concerns driving institu-
tional behavior by rising powers such as China. Status refers to “collective beliefs 
about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, cul-
ture, demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout)” (Larson, 
Paul, and Wohlforth 2014:7). The capability for organization and leadership is demon-
strated very clearly through the initiation and support of new international institu-
tions, and as such, may quickly alter the subjective beliefs of other members of inter-
national society. Status seeking may be a key feature of the foreign policies of rising 
powers such as China (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Wolf 2014), and cannot be dis-
missed as an autonomous factor in motivating Chinese parallel institution building. 
Lincoln Hines, for example, argues that the creation of the AIIB was part of China’s 
attempt to improve its status in the social hierarchy of the Asia-Pacific (Hines 2016), 
and China’s Belt Road Initiative appears to have been very successful at capturing im-
aginations and provoking discussions around the world. Status-seeking via parallel 
institution-building would not carry clear implications about the type of institution 
that would result, aside from the need for these institutions to be widely recognized 
and deemed successful among the target audience. Evidence of magnanimous decisions, 
highly visible displays of some valued good, or devotion of resources to cultivating a 
country’s international image, would be indicators for status as a driver of parallel 
institution building.  
Fourth, the very logic of institution-building suggests a key role for legitimacy 
concerns in the origins of parallel institution building. Patrick Cottrell recently sug-
gested that delegitimated institutions are more likely to be subject to attempts to re-
place them (Cottrell 2009). This would suggest that parallel institution building may be 
a response to the legitimacy deficits of established institutions. The legitimacy deficits 
of established G7-backed financial institutions have been linked to Asia’s financial 
regionalism drive (Sohn 2005). A related phenomenon is that the creation of parallel 
institutions may be a powerful way for powerful states to legitimate their preferences. 
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Why, after all, would states opt for a multilateral approach over uni- or bilateralism? 
And why would a powerful state such as China invest in institutions, and often bind 
itself to multilateral rules, when it could alternatively go it alone? Here, there are two 
logics at work. The first is the logic of self-binding, whereby China can reassure other 
states of its benign intentions by committing to rules and pooling influence over its 
policies via multilateral institutions (Chen and Liu 2017; Ikenberry 2001; Wolf 2014). 
This relies on a transactional understanding of legitimacy that emerges from a kind of 
social contract between powerful and less powerful states (Lake 2009). Second, there 
may be something inherently self-legitimating about multilateralism itself, under-
stood as policy coordination among three or more states in accordance with a general-
ized principle of conduct (Ruggie 1992). Multilateralism and institutionalization typi-
cally involve compromises. China’s preferences will be deemed more legitimate if they 
are pursued through, and receive the blessing of, international institutions. The logic 
of legitimacy concerns suggests that where existing institutions are widely deemed to 
be legitimate, parallel institutions may copy their structures and practices. Where ex-
isting institutions are widely perceived as lacking legitimacy, parallel institutions will 
seek to correct their perceived failures. Legitimacy concerns may therefore be a key 
reason behind parallel institution building. 
6. Implications of China’s Parallel Institutions for Global Govern-
ance  
While existing literature has focused mostly on explaining the emergence of parallel 
institutions, the creation of a range of new institutions by a new world power raises 
the question of their broader impact. At this stage, it is far from clear what type of 
parallel institutions most of China’s new institutions will turn out to be. The extent to 
which they take on rivalrous relationships to existing institutions, or promote social 
purposes substantively different from them, is still a topic of heated debate. Until this 
picture becomes clearer, the downstream effects of China’s parallel institution build-
ing will be far from clear. There are nonetheless theoretical propositions that can pro-
vide insights into the likely implications of parallel institution building for existing 
institutions and the policy areas they regulate.  
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First, the construction of substitutive or competing parallel institutions will, by 
definition, have implications for the international distribution of political authority. 
At the same time, institutional proliferation in some policy fields may have other 
power-redistributive effects. The creation of new multilateral development banks, for 
example, can be expected to alter the terms of finance in favor of borrowing countries 
by providing them with greater forum shopping opportunities. This will also likely 
heighten inter-institutional competition for loan provision. The policy field of multi-
lateral development finance thus also suggests that, in the absence of substantive con-
flict over social purpose, parallel institution building may be only a second-best strat-
egy for a rising power seeking to redistribute political authority in its favor. This will 
be truer still if rising powers have already invested heavily in established institutions 
before turning to alternatives. 
At the same time, the pursuit of a parallel institutionalist strategy by China may 
improve its exit options and convey it greater bargaining power to reform established 
institutions (Chen and Liu 2017; Zangl et al. 2016). This may operate as a spur to estab-
lished powers to concede institutional reform in order to co-opt China into existing 
institutions. At the same time, however, the cultivation of exit options by dissatisfied 
states may ironically reinforce the status quo in established institutions. If the most 
dissatisfied members of an organization choose exit over voice, spurs to reform may 
evaporate and entrenched coalitions may reinforce their positions, albeit in a dimin-
ished institution (Hirschman 1970). Whether parallel institution-building facilitates or 
hinders the reform of established institutions remains an open question.   
Second, institutional proliferation creates new opportunities for inter-
institutional political action. Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier identify three forms of 
cross-institutional political strategies that are made possible by the existence of more 
than one institution operating in a given domain. These are forum shopping, regime 
shifting, and strategic inconsistency (Alter and Meunier 2009a:17). Forum shopping 
refers to actors’ selection of the most favorable venue for their problem or goal. As 
argued above, this can erode the political authority of established institutions. Regime 
shifting refers to shifting an international policy process or activity from one interna-
tional venue to another in order to alter the status quo (Helfer 2004:14). The possibili-
ties for regime shifting will presumably be enhanced through the creation of new in-
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stitutions in an already institutionalized environment. Strategic inconsistency is the 
creation of contradictory or incompatible rules between institutions with the inten-
tion of undermining the least preferred one (Raustiala and Victor 2004:301–2). This 
would only be a successful strategy if China’s parallel institutions take on rules of 
economic regulation that both differ and are equally or more viable than existing 
ones. Which of these inter-institutional effects takes place will depend heavily on the 
type of parallel institutions that China ultimately sets up.  
In the long run, studies of parallel institution building will also have to consider 
not only how the new institutions relate to established ones, but how the new institu-
tions interact with each other. Does the sum total of parallel institutions add up to a 
coherent institutional order, organized around coherent principles and operating in 
complementary ways? Or do parallel institutions emerge in a patchwork manner in 
response to specific features of the established institutional order, relieving pressures 
for its reform and resulting in a symbiosis of Western-centred and Sinocentric insti-
tutional orders? Whether intentionally or not, many theorists insist that state-
societies ultimately transfer elements of their domestic systems to the global level 
(Katzenstein 1985; Kupchan 2014; Van der Pijl 1998). The fact that some parallel insti-
tutions appear to extend the influence of the Communist Party of China (Chow 2016; 
Zhang 2016) or post-Soviet strongmen (Khitakhunov, Mukhamediyev, and Pomfret 
2016; Michel 2015; Roberts and Moshes 2015) suggests they are unlikely to simply 
replicate Western modes of organization. Or will they? It is frequently emphasized that 
the existing institutions have generated a robust set of dynamics—such as deep eco-
nomic interdependence and a nascent global civil society—that exert strong material 
incentives and normative pressures to conform to fundamental scripts of market ra-
tionality and liberal political legitimacy (Ikenberry 2011; Meyer 2009; Stephen 2014). 
This would suggest that even competitive parallel institution-building faces strong 
systemic constraints. 
7. Conclusion 
The rise of China in an already institutionalized status quo creates novel dynamics in 
the institutional order. Rather than constituting a rare exception, parallel institution-
building constitutes a key tool in China’s multilateral strategies. This paper has drawn 
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on existing literature on China’s institutional initiatives, and theory-guided literature 
on institutional proliferation, to develop a typology of parallel institutions. The type of 
parallel institutions China or other actors set up is informative of the factors account 
for their creation and is revealing regarding their downstream implications for the 
institutional environment and the policy fields they regulate.  
The study of China’s new institutions as parallel institution-building poses a set of 
new research challenges. Identifying parallel institutions is the first of them. Parallel 
institutions may be formal intergovernmental organizations, but they may also be 
informal, weakly institutionalized, and challenge traditional understandings of multi-
lateralism. This paper has argued that qualitative judgments about salient actors and 
processes in a given policy field will play an important role in distinguishing parallel 
institutions from other forms of multilateralism. This admittedly sacrifices parsimony 
for comprehensiveness. But overlooking meaningful cases of parallel institution-
building due to stringent criteria delineating formal from informal institutions, or 
multilateralism from bi- or unilateralism, may distort rather than clarify our under-
standing of China’s institutional choices.  
One avenue for future research is to develop and test more specific hypotheses 
about when and where parallel institution building is likely to occur in the context of 
international power shifts. As this paper highlights, existing accounts differ on this 
point. Moreover, it is not clear that theories developed to explain the creation of new 
formal, multilateral organizations will carry over, without modification, to the broad-
er category of parallel institutions. Integrating insights from theories of international 
power shifts with the insights of regime complexity literature would be one path to 
explore. Another potentially critical line of inquiry will be to further historicize our 
understanding of parallel institutions. Parallel institution building is hardly new: the 
Cold War system generated competing institutional projects on either side of the iron 
curtain. Yet investigating how institutions have been founded in relation to existing 
ones may also play a critical role in expanding our understanding of the development 
of global governance since the mid to late nineteenth century.  
Ultimately, future research will also need to shed light on the implications of par-
allel institution building. This encompasses how parallel institutions affect the struc-
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tures and procedures of established institutions, what implications this has for gov-
ernance in a given area, and ultimately how parallel institutions interact with each 
other across issue areas. Given the proliferation of parallel institutions, this emerging 
research agenda promises to deliver new insights into the rise of China and its effects 
on international politics, and beyond. 
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Appendix 
I. Codebook on China’s Multilateral Initiatives 
Note on the Data: This dataset has been produced in order to gain a comprehensive 
overview of China’s multilateral engagements in the years 1990-2016. To that end, 
existing data from the Yearbook of International Organizationsvi and an article given out 
by the Mercator Institute for China Studiesvii have been matched together. In addition, a 
news article search using Lexis Nexis Academic wielded additional results. The so-
gathered data has been formatted into 5 variables. 
Name of Multilateral Initiative 
The variable is categorical and contains 25 observations. 
In order to classify as ‘multilateral initiative’, two criteria have to be fulfilled. 
One, in some form or the other, the government of the People’s Republic of China, has 
to be involved in the creation of the ‘multilateral initiative’ (thereby discounting ob-
servations such as civil-society organizations or non-profits with no state- involve-
ment). Two, any initiative must manifest in some physical way (annual summits, min-
isterial conferences, registering an IGO, signing a treaty etc.). 
As an example, the proposed Nicaragua Canal has failed to register on both counts. 
As of March 2018, there has been no sign of a concrete treaty signature or any con-
certed efforts to build said canal.viii Second, there has been no clear sign that the mu-
nicipal government of Hong Kong or the Chinese governments, respectively, have tak-
en any measures to be involved in the project.  
                                                 
vi (Eds.). (n.d. ). Yearbook of International Organizations 2016-2017, Volume 6. Leiden, Niederlande: 
BRILL. Retrieved Mar 16, 2018, from https://brill.com/view/title/33166 
vii Heilmann, S., Rudolf, M., Huotari, M., & Buckow, J. (2014). China’s shadow foreign policy: parallel 
structures challenge the established international order. China Monitor, 18, 28. 
viii It is correct that the Nicaraguan National Assembly approved a bill creating certain managerial 
rights and a financial pool for the project in tandem with a privately owned construction company in 
Hong Kong. However, this does not show that there is any state-led involvement by the Chinese gov-
ernment. Over all, there are mounting news reports that the canal will not be build, see for example: 
https://www.elfinancierocr.com/economia-y-politica/incertidumbres-financieras-desvanecen-
sueno-de/7HFF44CY3RBVVE7BR3YRKJ3XZY/story/  
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China’s Role 
Numerical variable with four values. 1 = “Co-Founding Member”, 2 = “Founding Mem-
ber”, 3 = “Leading Role”, 4 = “Sole Initiator” 
This variable measures the level of ‘institutionalization’ of China’s initiative, 
whereby low scores reveal high levels of institutionalization (such as being mem-
ber-state to an intergovernmental organization) and high scores signal low or non-
existent levels of formal institutionalization (charting an informal congress, series 
of ministerial summits etc.) Additionally, the value 4 is given when the Chinese gov-
ernment acts in an informal unilateral way but the ‘initiative itself will yield multi-
lateral effects’ (unilaterally hosting a world internet conference, creating a payment 
system in Renminbi open to private users in other countries etc.) 
FREQUENCY NUMERIC LABEL 
1 Co-Founding Member 
9 Founding Member 
11 Leading Role 
4 Sole Initiator 
 
Issue Area 
The variable is categorical. It can take the form of “Economy”, “Security”, and “Multi-
ple”. To be classified as such, the main purpose of the organization or initiative was 
taken as the precursor to the category. In cases where there was no clear pattern, the 
variable takes the form “Multiple”. If there was one overarching issue area and in later 
years the organization or initiative explored another smaller issue area, the variable 
still is named for the former one (as in the case of SCO for example).  
Notes 
Denotes the purpose of the institution or initiative.  
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Year 
Lists the year in which there was the first recorded meeting (for informal initiatives) 
or treaty signing (for IGOs). When an IGO was formed after an informal meeting, it will 
be highlighted in the notes. In this case, and only if the so-formed IGO is not an inde-
pendent initiative to the forgone multilateral engagement (meaning that the IGO will 
override the informal meeting and not complementing it), the year given will be the 
recorded meeting. That is why, for example, the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organi-
zation (APSCO) is listed as created in 1992 (when the official IGO was signed in 2005). 
And likewise, AMRO is listed as being created in 2016. Although, the prior CMIM initia-
tive happened in 2012. In the case of CMIM and AMRO, two separate entries are there-
fore needed.  
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II. Description and Literature Review of China’s Multilerateral Initi-
atives 
Security 
One of China’s first steps towards new institution building came in 1999, when it 
signed on to the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia 
(CICA). A product of the Soviet collapse, the CICA was first proposed by the government 
of Kazakhstan at the United Nations originally in 1992. It reflects the concept of a 
“Eurasian” space and has promoted some limited coordination over terrorism (Allison 
2004:481). With the United States and Japan as observers, China and Russia assume 
central roles (Mu 2014). It replicates some of the tasks of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), an informal dialogue on security and confidence-building founded in 1994, 
which includes non-Asian participants such as the European Union and the United 
States (Emmers and Tan 2011; Johnston 1999; Katsumata 2006). The SCO and CICA have 
been identified as institutional mechanisms for China to counter US military alliances 
in Asia (Wang 2015:17). 
China has also been particularly active in promoting the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) as a key security institution in Asia (Aris 2011; Yuan 2010). It 
emerged in 1996 as the “Shanghai Five” between Russia, China, and three Central 
Asian countries. Since June 2017, India and Pakistan joined the group as full members 
alongside China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries. The SCO fosters security and 
intelligence cooperation between its members, but has expanded its remit to include 
new areas such as extradition treaties and rules governing so-called ‘international 
information security’.ix Applications by the United States for observer status have 
been rejected. For critics, the SCO promotes authoritarian rule (Ambrosio 2008). Ac-
cording to Alison Bailes, the SCO “explicitly rejects both European (‘Western’) and glob-
al norms of human rights, political liberties, good governance in general, and the right 
                                                 
ix Described by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence: “Whereas the SCO Member 
States believe that content is a potential security threat and should be regulated, the ‘Western con-
sensus’ considers this level of content regulation to be a threat to fundamental human rights.”  
https://ccdcoe.org/sco.html  
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and duty both of states and international institutions to intervene in other states’ in-
ternal abuses” (Bailes 2007:16). These institutions have emerged alongside existing 
mechanisms such as the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, a mutual defense 
pact created under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Promot-
ed strongly by Russia, in 2002 it was upgraded to a formal international organization 
in the Cooperative Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russia uses its membership in 
each of these institutions to preserve friendly regimes in the regime and limit exter-
nal influence (Frost 2009).  
Regional and Inter-regional Forums 
Another facet of China’s new multilateral initiatives in its early phases was the con-
struction of several (inter-)regional forums and dialogue platforms for international 
cooperation in the global South (Sohn 2012). While these platforms are typically broad, 
informal mechanisms that promote only shallow cooperation, they must be seen in 
the context of China’s growing enthusiasm for multilateralism in Asia as a path to 
greater international influence, overcoming its earlier fears of being ganged-up on by 
smaller powers (Breslin 2010:718–27; De Santis 2010; Shambaugh 2013:95–105; Yuan 
2001). While the initial phases of China’s regional multilateral diplomacy focused on 
greater engagement with existing institutions, most notably ASEAN (ASEAN Plus Three 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum) and the East Asian Summit (Breslin 2008; He 2014; 
Hund 2003; Stubbs 2002), it has increasing taken the lead in exercising organizational 
leadership and establishing new platforms for regional dialogue.  
In Asia, at the more formal and institutionalized end of this spectrum is the Asia 
Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), an inter-governmental organization founded by China and 
17 other Asian countries in 2002. It was proposed initially by Thailand and is designed 
to provide a pan-Asian platform of dialogue on economic integration and foster col-
laborative projects (Bunyavejchewin and Nimmannorrawong 2016).x As China’s eco-
nomic interests with non-Asian regions have expanded, so has China’s readiness to 
exercise institutional influence via China-centered regional forums. One of the earli-
est took place in Beijing in 2000 with the inaugural Forum on China–Africa Coopera-
                                                 
x http://www.acd-dialogue.org/about-acd.html  
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tion (FOCAC) (Alden 2005; Taylor 2011). This model of triennial hub-and-spokes con-
sultations has since been replicated in other world regions, via the China-Arab States 
Cooperation Forum (first convened in Cairo in 2004)xi (Jalal 2014; Yao 2014) and the 
China-CELAC Forum between China and the countries of the Community of Latin 
America and Caribbean States (first held in Beijing in 2015), directly imposing into the 
United States ‘backyard’ (Yu 2015). 
The most prominent of China’s inter-regional forums is the annual BRICS Summit 
and its associated working groups and forums. While BRIC foreign ministers first met 
as a group in 2006, this informal club of major emerging economies went through a 
process of rapid institutionalization and met for the first time at heads of government 
level in 2009 (for overviews, see Chin 2015; Cooper 2016; Stuenkel 2013). In addition 
to the annual leaders’ summit, the BRICS format has grown to encompass foreign min-
isters’ summits, intergovernmental national security meetings, a BRICS Business Fo-
rum, and (since June 2017) a BRICS Political Parties, Think-tanks, and Civil Society 
Organizations Forum. In this format, the BRICS summits have come to resemble the 
Group of Seven (G7) summits of major industrialized countries. 
At the same time, China has breathed new life into Asian track-two diplomacy.xii 
In 2001 China initiated the Bo’ao Forum for Asia, a non-profit foundation registered in 
China for annual gatherings of governmental, business and academic elites from Asia 
and abroad (Bo’ao Forum for Asia 2001).xiii It is modeled as an Asian answer to the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, it is designed to be “led by Asians and 
guided from perspectives of Asian interests and views…”.xiv   
China has also cooperated with other ASEAN Plus Three countries to create the 
Network of East Asian Think-tanks (NEAT), which receives government funding and 
had its founding conference in Beijing in September 2003, and it is dedicated to “sup-
port, promote, and develop the ideas of East Asian cooperation and regionalism” (NEAT 
2009). These initiatives are not public enough to meet most definitions of formal mul-
                                                 
xi In an example of parallel institution building by an established power, in 2012 an inaugural Unit-
ed States-Gulf Cooperation Council Strategic Forum (SCF) was established. 
xii Track two diplomacy refers to informal international contacts and activities between non-
governmental bodies and individuals. 
xiii http://english.boaoforum.org/gyltbjjsen.jhtml/  
xiv http://english.boaoforum.org/gyltbjjsen.jhtml/  
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tilateralism, but they do depend on international recognition and participation. They 
can be seen, along with the international proliferation of Chinese media, Chinese 
think tanks, and cultural Confucius Institutes, as part of China’s conscious attempt to 
build “soft power” (Dingding 2015; Mingjiang 2008; Nye 2005; Shambaugh 2013:210–
16). 
Finance 
As China’s institutional initiatives have matured, it has begun to set up new bodies 
that, to varying extents, replicate the policy functions of already existing institutions. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), a keystone of the post-war economic order, has 
three core policy functions: research and policy advice, multilateral surveillance of 
global financial and economic risks, and crisis lending. Each of these policy domains 
has come within the purview of new institutions in which China plays a major role 
(Sohn 2013).  
In 2015, the BRICS countries established a Contingent Reserve Arrangement with 
a reserve pool of US $100 billion, designed as a pool of credit for BRICS states to access 
in times of short-term balance of payments pressures, although it is of primarily 
symbolic value (Biziwick, Cattaneo, and Fryer 2015; Eichengreen 2014; Henning 
2017:102). China has also been involved in the much bigger Chiang Mai Initiative Mul-
tilateralization (CMIM) among the finance ministries and central banks of the ASEAN 
countries, China, Japan, and South Korea (ASEAN Plus Three), with a reserve pool of US 
$240 billion (Henning 2017; Sussangkarn 2011).xv The CMIM is a successor to the earli-
er Chiang Mai Initiative (2000-2010), a series of bilateral swap arrangements which 
was a legacy of Japan’s failed attempt to push for an Asian Monetary Fund after the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 (Biziwick et al. 2015:12–13; Lipscy 2003). These initia-
tives replicate the crisis lending policy function of the IMF, but each includes clauses 
linking disbursements to the engagement of the IMF.  
This has been complemented since 2011 by an ASEAN Plus Three (APT) surveil-
lance facility called the ASEAN Plus Three Macroeconomic Research Office (APT AMRO), 
which was upgraded to the status of a full international organization in February 2016 
                                                 
xv http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/Publications/FAQs/CMIM.pdf  
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(Grimes 2015; Rana, Chia, and Jinjarak 2012). Its offices are in Singapore. Its surveil-
lance function focuses on Asia but overlaps with the IMF’s surveillance mandate. This 
and other “regional financial arrangements” (Henning 2017) are therefore often seen 
as steps towards an Asian IMF (Grimes 2011; The Japan Times 2016). They may also 
encroach on the role of the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks 
(EMEAP) as an informal forum for central bank cooperation. 
In addition, China has taken several concrete steps to promote the Renminbi as 
international currency (Chen and Cheung 2011; Eichengreen 2011). One step has been 
the creation, announced by the People’s Bank of China in March 2015, of the Cross-
Border Inter-Bank Payments System (CIPS) for international payments denominated in 
renminbi (Borst 2016). The Chinese central bank describes CIPS as a “payment super-
highway” for financial transactions such as trade settlement, direct investment and 
fund transfers (BNP Paribas 2016). It is designed to reduce transaction costs of interna-
tional trading in renminbi and alleviating compatibility issues between the global 
Brussels-based SWIFTxvi network and China’s own China National Advanced Payment 
System (CNAPS). It also has security implications, as the United States has used its in-
fluence to pressure EU countries into pressuring the SWIFT cooperative to deny access 
to Iranian banks at the time of UN economic sanctions against Iran.xvii  
An additional element in China’s new financial infrastructure is China UnionPay 
(Wu 2012). China UnionPay started as a domestic bank card payment system and main-
tained until October 2015 a state-sanctioned monopoly over card payments there. In 
terms of total transaction value, China UnionPay has become the largest bank card 
group in the world, accounting for over a third of the US $21.6 trillion payments mar-
ket. On the other hand, its international presence is still minor, claiming just 0.5 per-
cent of the global market, while Visa and Mastercard continue to represent over 80 
percent (Weinland and Wildau 2017). It is nonetheless fast-expanding, particularly in 
developing countries, and its cards are accepted in over 140 countries worldwide.xviii 
Such initiatives appear to be important steps assisting in the internationalization of 
                                                 
xvi Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). 
xvii https://www.swift.com/insights/press-releases/update_iran-sanctions-agreement ; 
https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance/swift-and-
sanctions#HasSWIFTeverdisconnectedbanksforsanctionspurposes?  
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China’s currency, while at the same time weakening US companies’ grips on global 
financial infrastructure and the “structural power” that this confers. 
Finally, China has taken steps, in collaboration with international partners, to 
construct alternative global credit ratings (Mennillo 2017). Despite frequent criticism 
of their impartiality and accuracy, the global market for credit ratings is still over-
whelmingly dominated by the “big three” Western credit rating agencies (CRAs): 
Standard and Poor’s Ratings Services, Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch Ratings. In 
addition to the development of major Chinese CRAs such as Dagong Global Credit Rat-
ing, China has also supported the creation, in June 2013, of the Universal Credit Rating 
Group based in Hong Kong. Registered as a private shareholding company, it is a joint 
venture of Dagong Global Credit Rating Company in China, founded by the People’s 
Bank of China and the State Economic and Trade Commission of China, RusRating JSC, 
a credit rating agency authorized by Russia’s Central Bank, and Egan-Jones Ratings 
Company, a US-based private company. In addition to this cornering of a lucrative 
global market by American companies, there are considerable concerns in China and 
Russia at the alleged bias of Western CRAs. The Chairperson of Dagong, Guan 
Jianzhong, has accused established CRAs of political bias in their sovereign ratings and 
stated that Dagong focuses more narrowly on repayment capacity. “In the western 
countries, they use the credit rating as a tool to protect their own profits, their own 
interests,” according to Guan Jianzhong (Tanas 2016). 
Internet Governance 
Given the internet’s transformational role in modern society and economics, the 
emerging field of transnational internet governance has been the site of contending 
transnational governance initiatives in which China has attempted to take a leading 
role (Drissel 2006; Mueller 2017). While the internet governance regime reflects a 
“multi-stakeholder” model of governments, private companies, and non-governmental 
organizations, it is United States companies (such as Google), regulators (such as the 
US Department of Commerce) and semi-private bodies (such as the Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN) that have exercised predominant influ-
                                                                                                                                               
xviii http://www.unionpayintl.com/sg/mediaCenter/newsCenter/marketUpdate/3008689.shtml  
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ence (Ebert and Maurer 2013). China has pushed, together with Russia and other coun-
tries, for a model of “information security” and “internet sovereignty” that differs 
from the access and free speech emphasis of most Western countries (Maurer 2011). 
While China has advanced its own positions within the UN’s UN-based World Summits 
on the Information Society and the Internet Governance Forum (created 2006), it has 
also taken the lead in creating the annual Wuzhen-based “World Internet Conference”, 
a multi-stakeholder forum inaugurated in 2014, in which the Chinese government 
projected its leadership ambitions alongside Chinese internet corporations such as 
Huawei and Alibaba (Shen 2016). 
Space Technology 
China has played a leading role in fostering the creation of the Asia-Pacific Space Co-
operation Organization, a formal IGO with currently eight member states. Its founding 
convention was signed in 2005 and commits its signatories to promote collaboration 
in peaceful applications of space science and technology. Located in Beijing, it resem-
bles many features of the European Space Agency (established in 1975). It exists along-
side platforms such as the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS), set up by the General Assembly in 1959.  
Trade and Investment Treaties 
As economic opening-up has been central to China’s economic modernization, it first 
prioritized accession to the World Trade Organization. But beginning in the early 
2000s, China also began to seek free trade agreements and bilateral investment trea-
ties with other countries (Jiang 2010; Song and Yuan 2012; Zeng 2010, 2015). Today, in 
addition to over twelve bilateral preferential trade agreements, a further nine under 
negotiation, and the trilateral China-Japan-Korea negotiations,xix China has become a 
strong advocate of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a pro-
posed preferential trade agreement between the ten ASEAN countries and six other 
countries which account for around 40 percent of world trade (Das 2013; Parameswa-
ran 2016).xx The RCEP’s areas of negotiation include trade in goods, services, invest-
                                                 
xix http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/fta_qianshu.shtml/  
xx India withdrew in November 2019. 
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ment, intellectual property, competition policy, and dispute settlement (Ravenhill 
2016). The RCEP was frequently perceived as a regional rival to the United States’ ini-
tial championing of the ill-fated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from which China 
was excluded (Song and Yuan 2012; Wilson 2015). China has also expressed interest in 
promoting the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) under the auspices of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). As the United States under President Trump 
appears to have abandoned further trade liberalization, China now appears as the un-
contested center of trade liberalization in Asia. While RCEP and TPP have been seen as 
competing economic integration projects, all of them replicate the policy functions 
that are performed by the World Trade Organization. 
Multilateral Development Banks 
Finally, two of the most widely-discussed of China’s new institutions are new multi-
lateral development banks, the AIIB and the BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) New Development Bank. These institutions operate in the same policy 
field as Western-dominated legacy institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank 
and the World Bank. The New Development Bank has its origins in intra-BRICS cooper-
ation (Eichengreen 2014; Humphrey 2015; Qobo and Soko 2015; Reisen 2015). Its 
founding treaty was signed at the sixth BRICS Summit in Brazil in July 2014. Its stated 
purpose is to fund infrastructure and development projects “in BRICS and other 
emerging economies and developing countries.”xxi It has an initial subscribed capital 
of $50 billion and an initial authorized capital of US$100 billion and is located in 
Shanghai. The AIIB, opened in 2016, developed from plans within the Communist Party 
of China and is open to all countries (Chin 2016; Hameiri and Jones 2018; Stephen and 
Skidmore 2019; Yu 2016; Zhou 2015). These new banks have been seen as “a direct 
alternative and challenge to the 70 years-old Bretton Woods system” (Heilmann et al. 
2014:6). 
Belt Road Initiative 
The AIIB appears to have grown out of China’s broader plans for an international in-
frastructure push under the umbrella concept of the One Belt, One Road (later restyled 
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as the Belt Road Initiative [BRI]). The BRI would expand and diversify the physical 
hardware of global commerce in China’s near and far abroad, diversifying Chinese 
trade routes, fostering economic integration with China, building physical infrastruc-
ture, and providing an outlet for Chinese surplus capital, all the while fostering the 
emergence of a Sinocentric economic space in Eurasia (Callahan 2016; Wang 2016; 
Yunling 2016). In some respects, the BRI has displaced earlier initiatives such as Rus-
sia’s Eurasian Economic Union, the stalled TPP, or the United States’ New Silk Road 
(announced in 2011), which was largely focused on integrating Afghanistan and its 
neighbors (Brugier 2014; Mcbride 2015). The BRI includes a Silk Road Fund (established 
in 2014) with an initial capital of US$40 billion,xxii increased by $124 billion in May 
2017.xxiii Under the auspices of the BRI, China has now held two global summits styled 
as the Belt and Road Forum. The first was held in Beijing in May 2017 and was attend-
ed by representatives of at least 57 countries.xxiv A second was held in April 2019.  
                                                                                                                                               
xxi http://www.ndb.int/download/Agreement%20on%20the%20New%20Development%20Bank.pdf  
xxii http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23775/23767/index.html  
xxiii https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-africa/china-pledges-124-billion-for-new-
silk-road-as-champion-of-globalization-idUSKBN18A02I  
xxiv http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/belt-and-road-attendees-list/ 
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